Correct Option
The Indian National Congress, despite its consistent opposition to the Two-Nation Theory, ultimately agreed to the partition of the country primarily to prevent large-scale communal violence. The period leading up to 1947 witnessed severe Hindu-Muslim riots, notably after the Muslim League's 'Direct Action Day' on August 16, 1946, which resulted in widespread bloodshed in areas like Calcutta and Noakhali. Congress leaders, including Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru, concluded that partition was a necessary, albeit painful, measure to avert further civil war, maintain law and order, and ensure the stability of the newly independent nation. Lord Mountbatten also played a role in convincing the leadership that this was the only viable path to transfer power peacefully.
Incorrect Options
1) The principle of two-Nation theory was then acceptable to them:
This statement is incorrect. The Indian National Congress consistently rejected the Two-Nation Theory, which advocated for separate nations for Hindus and Muslims. Their agreement to partition was a pragmatic decision to avoid further communal violence, not an acceptance of the underlying theory.
2) It was imposed by the British Government and the Congress was helpless in this regard:
This statement is incorrect. While the British government, through Lord Mountbatten, presented the partition plan, the Congress was an active participant in the negotiations. The Congress leadership, after careful deliberation and considering the prevailing circumstances, reluctantly agreed to the partition, indicating that they were not entirely helpless but made a strategic choice.
4) India would have otherwise lost the opportunity to attain freedom:
This statement is partially true in the broader context of securing independence. However, the immediate and most compelling reason for the Congress's agreement to partition was the escalating communal violence and the desire to prevent further bloodshed and civil unrest. While securing independence was paramount, the fear of losing the opportunity for freedom was secondary to the imperative of averting a civil war.